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I. INTRODUCTION
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,' the United States Supreme
Court conducted a modem exploration of the fair use defense to copyright
infringement. A reflection of current pop culture, the dispute centered on the
alleged infringement of Roy Orbison's copyright in the rock ballad, "Oh,
Pretty Woman," by eccentric rap group 2 Live Crew.2 To aid in its analysis
of the § 107 fair use test prescribed by the Copyright Act of 1976,3 the Court
adopted the "transformative use standard" coined by Judge Pierre Leval in
his 1990 Harvard Law Review article Toward a Fair Use Doctrine.4 Twelve
years later, the Second Circuit attempted to follow Campbell with their deci-
sion in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Limited.5 The Second
Circuit included the "transformative" inquiry within their fair use analysis to
resolve a dispute involving a publisher's unauthorized reproduction of Grate-
ful Dead images within a biography.6 The ultimate finding of fair use was
correct, but the court failed to fully discuss the current role of "transforma-
tive use" under § 107, signaling the ongoing struggle to define a cognizable
doctrine. Applying § 107's constantly evolving, case-specific framework to
each dispute remains a chore for the federal courts and Bill Graham Archives
is no exception.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Dorling Kindersley Limited, Dorling Kindersley Publishing, Inc., and
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company (collectively "DK") created a biography,
with assistance from Grateful Dead Productions ("GDP"), entitled "Grateful
Dead: The Illustrated Trip" ("the book").7 The book was designed to take the
reader on a tour of the Grateful Dead's historical career through a chronology
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1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
2. Id. at 571.
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
4. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Stan-
dard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
5. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. (Bill I/), 448 F.3d 605 (2d
Cir. 2006).
6. See id. at 608-09.
7. Id. at 607.
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of memorable events. 8 Anticipating the use of images owned by Bill Graham
Archives ("BGA") within the book, DK's researcher contacted BGA on be-
half of GDP.9 BGA offered to accommodate DK's request in exchange for
permission to produce CDs and DVDs created from Grateful Dead concert
footage.1o While DK rejected BGA's offer, BGA tentatively granted DK
permission to produce the majority of the disputed images." But, just as
negotiations were near completion, the two parties failed to agree on pricing
for a few images, effectively preventing the finalization of an agreement.12
Without a licensing arrangement, DK nevertheless used seven of BGA's
copyrighted images within the book published in October 2003.13
The book, 480 pages in length, depicted the history of the Grateful Dead
through a timeline that spanned its pages.14 The timeline was surrounded by
text and over 2,000 images intended to represent specific events within the
band's career.15 In order to enhance the reader's experience, DK carefully
positioned the images on the timeline in correlation to the event that they
were intended to represent.16 The images at issue consisted of reproductions
of six Grateful Dead concert posters and one concert ticket in reduced form. 17
8. Id.










17. Bill 1, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 325 n.l. The first image depicted a poster for a
September 1967 Jefferson Airplane and Grateful Dead show. Id. The original
size was 14" x 20-5/8" and appeared in the book as 2-3/16" x 3-1/4". Id. The
second image represented a poster for two October 1969 concerts featuring
Jefferson Airplane and the Grateful Dead. Id. The original size was 14" x 21-
1/16" and appeared in the book as 2-15/16" x 4-5/16". Id. The third poster
image appeared as a concert ticket for a 1968 concert, with the original size
being 13-15/16" x 20-1/16" and the reproduced picture being 1-1/16" x 1-9/
16". Id. The fourth image depicted a poster promoting fifteen September 1980
concerts, with the original size being 19-1/2" x 27-3/4". Id. The final three
images depicted posters for the New Years concerts of 1988, 1991, and 1993.
See id. The 1988 and 1991 posters were both originally 13" x 19-1/2", while
the 1993 poster was 13" x 19". Id. The 1988 poster was reproduced with the
measurements of 2-11/16" x 3-15/16", the 1991 reproduction measured 2-13/
16" x 1-13/16", and the 1993 poster appeared as 2-11/16" x 3-7/8". Id.
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Near each image, a caption described the concert event it signi-
fied. 18
Aware of the book's publication, BGA demanded post-publication li-
censing fees, a demand that DK refused.19 BGA then filed suit against DK in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleg-
ing copyright infringement of seven images.20 BGA sought an injunction
against further publication of the book, destruction of all unsold copies, and
both actual and statutory damages.21
III. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 107
The district court reviewed both parties' motions for summary judgment
and ruled in favor of DK, whose position was grounded solely on the fair use
defense.22 Originally a judicially-created doctrine,23 § 107 of the Copyright
Act of 1976 now codifies the fair use defense.24 The statute lacks a defini-
tion of fair use, but it does provide four factors for the reviewing court to
evaluate.25 A reflection of criteria articulated in Folsom v. Marsh,26 the statu-
tory criteria include "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted
work."27 Although § 107 sets forth applicable factors for consideration, the
flexible framework of fair use allows the reviewing courts to adapt the doc-
18. Id.
19. Bill 11, 448 F.3d at 607.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Bill I, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 5678-79 (1976).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
25. Id.; see also H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 5679 ("Although the courts have consid-
ered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition
of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule
of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible .
26. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576
(1994) (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348 and citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990) and W. PATRY, THE
FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1-64 (1985)).
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trine on a case-by-case basis.28 None of the above factors within the statute
are exclusive.29
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In an opinion authored by Judge Daniels, the district court sought gui-
dance from § 107 to resolve the Bill Graham Archives dispute. In addressing
the first factor under the statutory framework, the district court noted the
Second Circuit's propensity towards a finding of fair use when the allegedly
infringing work fell within the § 107 preamble uses of criticism, comment or
research.30 After finding biographies to fit snugly alongside these preamble
uses and declaring the book to be a biographical work, the court determined
that the balance initially tilted in favor of fair use. 31 However, the district
court was careful to recognize that the "more important" inquiry to first fac-
tor analysis and "in fair use analysis generally" revolved around the trans-
formative nature of DK's use.32
V. SECOND CIRCUIT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.33 The court
agreed with the district court's overall evaluation of the § 107 factors.34 The
Second Circuit found DK's use of the images within the book to be suffi-
ciently transformative, thereby allowing DK to prevail on the fair use
defense.35
Beginning with the first factor of § 107's fair use test, the court empha-
sized the "transformative nature of the work" as critical to analyzing the pur-
pose and character of the use in question.36 With this consideration in mind,
the court determined that the images served as historical artifacts used to
28. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 5680.
29. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
30. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. (Bill 1), 386 F. Supp. 2d 324,
328 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("There is a strong presumption in the Second Circuit that
this factor favors the defendant if the allegedly infringing work fits within the
Section 107 preamble uses: criticism, comment, or research."); see also 17
U.S.C. § 107 (setting forth the preamble uses of: "criticism, comment, new
reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research.").
31. Id.
32. Id. at 328-29.
33. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. (Bill 1/), 448 F.3d 605, 615
(2d Cir. 2006).
34. Id. at 608-15.
35. Id. at 612.
36. Id. at 608 (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
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memorialize the occurrence of certain Grateful Dead concert events.37 This
use was separate and distinct from the images' original use as a form of
artistic expression and promotion for Grateful Dead concerts.38
Although satisfied that DK's transformative use signaled fair use, the
court strengthened its position by fully analyzing the aesthetic qualities.
Upon observing the images' significantly reduced size and inclusion within a
collage display, the court concluded that such a display was intended to en-
rich the presentation of Grateful Dead's history rather than exploit BK's
images.39 The minimal appearance of the images within the book appeared
to be just large enough for the reader to identify the contents and relate them
to the relevant concert.40 Similarly, the court noted that the appearance of the
images within the book constituted "less than one-fifth of one percent of the
book."41 The court ended its first factor analysis by briefly addressing the
commercial nature of DK's use.42 Although conceding that the book was for
profit, the court found DK's use to be "incidental" to its "commercial bio-
graphical value."43
After a thorough review of the purpose and character of DK's allegedly
infringing use, the court engaged in a brief discussion of the three remaining
fair use factors. Initially, the court revealed that the second factor, the nature
of the copyrighted work, may be of limited value where the work was being
used for transformative purposes, thereby dispensing with the presumption
favoring copyright holders of creative artworks.44 Although the poster
images were creative in nature, this statutory factor failed to bolster BGA's
position because DK's use of the images was limited to emphasizing their
historical value.45 Next, the court transitioned to a review of the third fair use
factor, the "amount and substantiality of the portion used."46 Noting the re-
production of the images in their entirety, the court nevertheless concluded
that the substantial size reduction signified DK's intent to display the mini-
mum image size and quality necessary for readers to recognize the images
and relate them to the relevant events.47 In addressing the final factor, the
37. Id. at 610.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 611.
40. Id. The court also identified the largest reproduction of a BGA image as 3" x
4", which is less than one-twentieth the size of the original. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 611-12.
43. Id. at 612.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 612-13.
46. Id. at 613.
47. Id.
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court reviewed the "effect of the use upon the market for or value of the
original."48 Holding that DK's use of the images "falls within a transforma-
tive market," the court refused to rule that BGA suffered any market harm
from such use. 49
Upon conclusion of the fair use analysis, the court held that the com-
bined weight of all factors leaned in favor of fair use. 50 DK had successfully
made fair use of the images contained within the book.
VI. PROPER SCOPE OF TRANSFORMATIVE USE
The Second Circuit correctly found fair use of the Grateful Dead
images. However, the court's express adoption of transformative use analy-
sis under the first fair use factor created a misleading impression as to the
effects of Judge Leval's concept on the entire fair use balance. Citing Judge
Leval's 1990 article, the Second Circuit proclaimed the transformative nature
of the work to be the paramount consideration in the court's analysis of only
the first statutory factor, "purpose and character of use."5' But, construing
Campbell, the Second Circuit then claimed the second factor to be of "lim-
ited usefulness" to the fair use inquiry if the work was being used for a
transformative purpose. 52 Likewise, in its discussion of the third factor, the
court determined that the amount and substantiality of copying varied with
the transformative use of the copyrighted work.53 The court's disposition of
the fourth factor also appeared to hinge on the consideration of transforma-
tive use, as is readily apparent by the court's determination that BGA did not
suffer market harm because DK's use fell within a transformative market.54
Thus, despite the Second Circuit's initial limitation of the transformative use
inquiry to the first factor, it is apparent that this consideration played a piv-
otal role in the entire fair use analysis.
Invited to clarify this modern concept, the Second Circuit should have
further expounded upon the reach of transformative use. In particular, the
court should have applied the proposition stated in Campbell which noted,
"the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use."55 This proposition seemed to imply that the transformative considera-
tion could play a role outside the ambit of the first factor. Based on the
district court's discussion of transformative use, such an interpretation of
48. Id.
49. Id. at 615.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 608.
52. Id. at 612.
53. Id. at 613.
54. See id. at 614-15.
55. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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Campbell is plausible.56 The Second Circuit's reluctance to support this con-
tention may have stemmed from the ambiguity present in Campbell, where
the Supreme Court failed to clearly articulate whether "other factors" were
limited to those affecting first factor analysis or if any factors that could
negatively affect a fair use finding were at risk.57 As a result of their reserva-
tions, the Second Circuit declined the opportunity to explain the contours of
transformative use within the fair use balance, suggesting uncertainty by the
courts as to its proper application.
VII. THE RECONFIGURATION OF THE FAIR USE BALANCE
The court's application of Judge Leval's transformative use concept also
revealed a possible movement towards an unbalanced fair use analysis. In
Bill Graham Archives, the Second Circuit's finding of DK's biographical use
as "transformatively different" under first factor analysis58 marked the begin-
ning of an uphill battle for BGA. With this conclusion firmly fixated in the
equation at the outset, the § 107 balance strongly tilted toward fair use. The
court's persistent evaluation of the remaining factors against the backdrop of
this damaging finding eventually amounted to an insurmountable obstacle for
BGA. Illustrative of this point is the court's analysis of the "nature" factor,
where the court found that DK's use of the images merely served to highlight
the images' historical value.59 Considering such use to be "transformatively
different" from the original purpose of creative expression,60 the court con-
cluded that the second factor had "limited weight" in the fair use balance. 6'
Thus, the court essentially canceled this statutory consideration from the fair
use calculation and effectively boosted DK's chances of prevailing on their
defense. With the court's persistent consideration of DK's transformative
use in all of the statutory factors, BGA had little chance of surviving DK's
summary judgment motion.
From Bill Graham Archives, it appears that a finding of transformative
use may be ultimately determinative to a finding of fair use. 62 Thus, if a
court following Bill Graham Archives initially finds transformative use
56. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. (Bill 1), 386 F. Supp. 2d
324, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The more important question under the first
factor, and in fair use analysis generally, is... 'whether and to what extent the
new work is 'transformative."" (emphasis added) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 579)).
57. Campbell, 519 U.S. at 579.
58. Bill /, 448 F.3d at 612.
59. Id. at 612-13.
60. Id. at 612.
61. Id. at 612-13.
62. See Jeremy Kudon, Form Over Function: Expanding the Transformative Use
Test for Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 579, 583 (2000) (proposing that a rigid
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within the first factor and deems it sufficiently transformative, circumstances
favoring the copyright holder may prove to be no match when viewed in light
of the alleged infringer's new use. Conversely, if the reviewing court does
not discover a transformative use or is unimpressed with the extent of the
transformation, the proponent of the fair use defense may face an unduly
heavy burden.63 Hinting to such a conclusion is Justice Souter's comment in
Campbell: "[A]lthough such transformative use is not absolutely necessary
for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright.., is generally furthered by
the creation of transformative works."64
Judge Leval cautioned against using the statutory fair use factors as a
mere judicial scorecard.65 Instead, he advocated for a thorough examination
of the fair use issue from "every pertinent corner" and urged the courts to
question whether and to what extent a fair use finding would, or would not,
fulfill the goals of the copyright.66 An apparent departure from this proposal,
Bill Graham Archives represents a concerning view of the fair use defense,
underscoring the need for clarification in such an essential component of
copyright law.67 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit's strong presumption to-
ward a fair use finding for biographical works limits the reliance copyright
holders should place on this decision for a true representation of fair use
adjudication. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court's finding of
the book as a biographical work and clearly endorsed a circuit-specific bias
towards deeming copyrighted work within such a medium as fair use.68
Serving as a foundation for the court's analysis, this presumption facilitated
the ultimate recognition of DK's use as transformative under the first statu-
tory factor.69 Thus, Bill Graham Archives fails to provide guidance to analo-
gous cases contested within circuits that decline to follow a similar approach.
approach to transformative use may lead to the labeling of the transformative
use test as a presumptively dispositive factor).
63. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132,
141-46 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that the Seinfeld trivia book had little or no
transformative purpose, the court relied on its finding in determining that the
defendant did not meet the four, § 107 factors in deciding that the book in-
fringed on the plaintiff's copyright).
64. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (emphasis
added).
65. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105,
1110 (1990)
("The factors do not represent a score card that promises victory to the winner
of the majority.").
66. See id. at 1110-11.
67. See id. at 1110 (finding fair use to be "a necessary part of the overall design").
68. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. (Bill 11), 448 F.3d 605,
608-12 (2d Cir. 2006).




The Second Circuit's failure to discuss the full effect of the transforma-
tive inquiry within fair use analysis highlights the difficulties that have arisen
in applying the flexible § 107 framework. Although the balancing test was
designed to accommodate change, the courts have consistently struggled to
articulate a cognizable system of working through the analysis. Judge
Leval's transformative factor is a rational attempt at clarifying the doctrine,
but Bill Graham Archives highlights a few problematic areas for the courts.
First, there may be some confusion as to whether transformative use is appli-
cable to the entire fair use analysis, or is only the paramount consideration
within the first factor. This ambiguity may lead to an inconsistent applica-
tion of the tweaked doctrine and scattered precedent. More importantly, the
current doctrine, as it incorporates "transformative use," may be evolving
into a disproportionate balancing test that renders the first factor as a sign of
impending success, or doom, for the copyright holder in their battle against
the fair use defense.

